Inferences about speech acts are often conditional, nonmonotonic, and involve the issue of time. Most agent communication languages, however, ignore these issues, due to the difficulty to combine them in a single formalism. This paper addresses such issues in defeasible logic, and shows how to express a semantics for ACLs in order to make nonmonotonic inferences on the basis of speech acts.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that the FIPA semantics for Agent Communication Languages (ACL) has some flaws [13] . First, the semantics is expressed in terms of private mental attitudes of agents. Therefore, it cannot be verified given common assumptions about agent systems. Second, the sincerity condition assumed in FIPA may be acceptable in cooperative circumstances, but is clearly wrong for persuasion and negotiation dialogues. Two solutions for these flaws have been discussed. (1) An ACL semantics can be given in terms of social attitudes, like commitments [12, 11] . Social attitudes are maintained in public, as a kind of common data structure. (2) An ACL semantics can be given in terms of public mental attitudes instead of private ones. This preserves the characteristics of the BDI-approach that underlies the FIPA semantics, without incurring the verifiability problems. Thus, [5, 6] use the notion of common ground, [9] refers to ostensible beliefs and goals and [2, 3] introduce public roles. These solutions fail to consider other problems, which emerge when new application domains are considered: in particular, ACL semantics (a) do not specify how to deal with non-monotonicity in communicative actions; (b) mostly ignore the problem of time, i.e. the possibility of timing the different aspects of communication, and the persistence of preconditions and effects. Here below are two examples illustrating these issues.
Example 1 (Non-monotonicity) Consider the dialogue: Seller: "Why don't you buy a Mercedes A class? It is safe." Buyer: "I heard that it may roll over." / Seller: "Yes, maybe it is not safe in that sense, but I know that you are not a driver who takes risks." The seller has to retract its assertion on the safety of the product to make a weaker one. Retraction makes inference about communicative actions nonmonotonic, because it is no longer true that every set of speech acts supports the same conclusions as its subsets.
Example 2 (Time and persistence) Suppose Ian sells at time 2 a faulty children's chair to John, causing John's child to get hurt. It is legally presumed that when a vendor sells a product, he acts in good faith, i.e., as if he were informing the client that the product is without faults. A witness, Kay, reveals at time 3 to John that the vendor had independently informed her at time 1 that the chair was faulty. Assume that the sincerity precondition of an 'inform' act persists into the future, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Given this assumption, we have at times 2 and 3 two conflicting vendor's beliefs about the quality of the chair and two conflicting client's beliefs about the same.
This paper shows how a temporal extension of defeasible logic (DL) can express FIPA-ACL semantics. The logic captures essential properties of speech acts. Our requirements for the logic are, besides modeling non-monotonicity and persistence, that it can formalize the key features of ACL semantics using public mental states attributed to the agents via the roles they play. The logic is illustrated by one example, i.e., FIPA's inform communicative act, but other FIPA constructs are easily captured.
Temporal Defeasible Logic
This paper provides computational-oriented approach to describe the behaviour of FIPA speech acts. We are interested in their non-monotonic character, their temporal aspects and the persistence of their preconditions and effects. [7] proposes an extension of DL [10] , an efficient rule-based non-monotonic formalism, able to capture such aspects. In this section we outline how to adjust the logic presented in [7] to model FIPA speech acts.
A theory in DL comprises a set of facts (represented by literals), a set of rules, partitioned in strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters, and a superiority relation, a binary relation over the set of rules. Facts are indisputable statements. Strict rules (a strict rule is noted as A → b where A is a possibly empty set of literals) are rules in the classical sense; this means that every time the antecedent holds (i.e., all the elements of A hold) then so does the conclusions b. Defeasible rules (noted as A ⇒ b) are rules whose conclusion can be defeated by contrary evidence. Defeaters (noted as A ; b) are rules that do not support a conclusion, but which can be used to prevent the derivation of the opposite conclusion. The superiority relation gives the relative strength of rules, and it is used in case of conflicts between rules, e.g., if r and s are rules then r s means that r prevails over s.
To accommodate the temporal aspects and the speech acts we enrich the language of DL with:
Based on the above elements a modal literal is an expression X t l (or its negation, i.e., ¬X t l) where X is a modal operator, t ∈ T and l is either a literal or a modal literal. For example the expression B t a G t r(b) p means that agent a believes at t that the goal of the role played by agent b at time t is (was, will be) p. A speech act is an expression st i, j (s,t) or the negation of it (i.e., ¬st i, j (s,t)), where i, j ∈ Ag∪Role, s is either a literal or a modal literal, st ∈ ST , and t ∈ T .
A rule is an expression lbl : A → x m, where lbl is a unique label of the rule, A is a (possibly empty) set of speech acts and modal literals, →∈ {→, ⇒, ;}, m is a modal literal and x is either π or τ signaling whether we have a persistent or transient rule.
A persistent rule is a rule whose conclusion holds at all instants of time after the conclusion has been derived, unless interrupting events occur; transient rules establish the conclusion only for a specific instant of time. Thus ex 1 : B 5 a p ⇒ π G 6 r(a) q means that if agent a at time 5 believes p, then the role played by agent a has the goal q at time 6 and the goal continues to hold after 6 until some event overrides the goal of q. If we change π into τ the resulting rule ex 2 : B 5 a p ⇒ τ G 6 r(a) q means that r(a) has the goal q at time 6, but we do not know whether the goal will persist after 6.
DL has a constructive proof theory where conclusions are labelled. The conclusion labels (also called proof tags) indicate the strength as well as the type of the conclusions. Specifically we have the following proof tags:
• +∆ π X t p (resp. +∆ τ X t p) we have a definite proof (i.e., a proof using only strict rules and facts) of X p at time t and X p continues to hold after t (resp. we have a definite proof of X p at time t); • +∂ π X t p (resp. +∂ τ X t p) we have a defeasible proof of X p at time t and X p continues to hold after t until X p is terminated (resp. we have a defeasible proof of X p at time t).
For each proof tag we also have the negative version (e.g., −∆ τ X t p) meaning that we can show that it is not possible to build a derivation with the given features. Definite transient derivations (i.e., conclusions tagged with ∆ τ ) are just standard derivations in DL using facts, strict rules and modus ponens. For definite persistent derivations we have an additional clause, that the conclusion was obtained at a previous time and was tagged as a definite persistent. Thus from +∆ π B 10 a p we can conclude +∆ π B t a p for t > 10. A defeasible transient derivation consists of three phases.
(1) We have to give an argument for the conclusion we want to prove (and the time we want to prove), thus we need an applicable transient rule whose conclusion has the required features. A rule is applicable if all the elements in the antecedent are provable. (2) We have to consider all possible counterarguments. This means that we have to consider all rules whose conclusion is in conflict with the conclusion we want to prove. (3) We have to rebut the counterarguments. We have two possibilities: (i) we can show that the counterargument does not hold, i.e., some of its premises do not hold; or (ii) we can show that the counterargument is weaker than an applicable argument for what we want to prove.
For defeasible persistent derivations we have an additional case: we can show that the conclusion was proved at a previous instant and that all possible arguments to terminate the validity of the conclusion from the time it was proved to the time of the current derivations either were not valid, or were weaker than the argument supporting the conclusion we want to prove. For the details see [7] 1 .
Proposition 1 [8] The extension of a defeasible theory from time t 0 to time t can be computed in time linear to the size of the theory, i.e., O(|Lit| · |R| · t), where Lit is the set of literals in the theory, R is the set of rules in the theory.
Reasoning about FIPA Semantics
We now show how DL formalism can express the semantics for ACLs. For ease of reference, let us focus on FIPA's inform and take [4] as a starting point. In FIPA, the meaning of communicative acts is defined in terms of rational effects (REs) and feasibility preconditions (FPs). The REs are the mental states the speaker wants to bring about in the hearer, and the FPs encode the appropriate conditions for issuing a communicative act. For instance, here is the FIPA definition of the inform communicative act:
As a feasibility precondition speaker a must believe what he says and he must not believe that hearer b already has an opinion on the conveyed proposition. The rational effect is that hearer b comes to believe p.
Operators like this can be used to generate a dialogue directly, but they can also be used in the interpretation of the utterances of the interlocutor. In FIPA, this methodology relies on axioms ( [4] , Properties 4 and 5) according to which, when a communicative act is executed, its FPs are assumed to be true, and its RE is wanted by the speaker 2 :
B(a, done(act) → FP(act)) B(a, done(act) ∧ agent(b, act)) → G(b, RE(act))) FIPA, like most other ACL semantics, does not specify some important aspects of communicative acts, such as temporal persistence and non-monotonicity. As regards persistence, in particular, the case of inform is instructive: hearer b can infer not only that the precondition that a's belief in the truth of p holds at the moment of execution of the communicative act, but also that this precondition persists into the future or that it held some time before the communicative act, and will hold afterwards.
Note that we adopt [1, 2] 's role-based approach to ACL: mental states are publicly attributed to dialogue participants, and can only change according to the rules of the dialogue. In the rules below beliefs and goals are attributed to roles (e.g., B r(a) ) as well as to individual agents (e.g., B a ).
Rules R inf = {i 1 , i 3 , ..., i 13 } define the meaning of an inform communicative act, for a standard type of cooperative dialogue, like information exchange, where one agent is supposed to know more than the other. Adding also rule i 2 allows to capture situations where the knowledge is more symmetric. In what follows, a, b are agents, r(a) and r(b) the role-playing-agents in the dialogue, inform is a speech act type, s is either a literal or a modal literal, and t < t are time points in T . Rules are prioritized as follows: ≺ inf = {i 2 i 1 , i 9 i 8 , i 9 i 10 , i 11 i 10 , i 13 i 12 }.
Rule i 1 describes how an inform act is performed by an agent a through an utterance event. The rule is defeasible since the communicative act can be retracted later, as indicated in rule i 2 . There are different ways of handling retraction. The solution is to withdraw the original communicative act by means of a defeater. This means that all the consequences that can be inferred from the act, expressed in rules i 3 − i 6 , are also withdrawn. If we would take the alternative solution of only retracting the content of the inform, we would need additional explicit rules to withdraw those consequences too.
The agent of actions utter and retract is the individual agent a and not its role r(a). The rules i 1 and i 2 are used to connect individual agents to their roles. These rules are non-persistent, since the action of uttering only temporally coincides with execution of an inform communicative act. If the agent makes an inform at a given time, it is not possible to infer that it is making the inform again at the next time instant.
The defeasible character of i 1 is necessary in applications where an agent is trying to persuade the other one and the other one can reply (see Example 1), or where two agents are trying to cooperatively find a solution and to advance arguments which are probed by the other one. In these types of dialogues the speaker can retract his assertions to avoid a contradiction. In information gathering scenarios like the ones considered by FIPA this is not necessary, since an agent is supposed to know more than the other.
Rules i 3 − i 5 represent the FPs of inform. Following Properties 4 and 5 of [4] , they are interpreted as strict rules. Only rule i 3 is persistent towards the future, since its effect is not affected by the consequent of other rules. Instead, since the inform possibly changes the beliefs of the hearer b, i 4 − i 5 are not persistent and they refer to the situation before the execution of the speech acts 3 : i 3 inform r(a),r(b) (s,t) → π B t r(a) s i 4 inform r(a),r(b) (s,t) → τ ¬B t−1 r(b) s i 5 inform r(a),r(b) (s,t) → τ ¬B t−1 r(b) ∼s Note that the beliefs in the consequent of the rules are not attributed to the agents as private beliefs, but to the roles they play: thus they have a public character 4 .
Rule i 6 represents the RE of inform: its propositional content is embedded in a goal of the speaker that the hearer believes it: i 6 inform r(a),r(b) (s,t) → π G t r(a) B t r(b) s FIPA does not allow explicit inferences about the success of the RE, but in our model of cooperative information exchange R inf , rule i 7 can represent that the hearer publicly adopts the information conveyed, if he believes that the speaker is reliable:
This does not necessarily mean that the hearer privately believes what was said. Only if there is no evidence to the contrary, we assume that individual agents believe what their roles believe (i 8 − i 13 ). Rule i 8 assumes that the speaker individually believes what he says, unless he is believed to be insincere (i 9 ). Rule i 10 assumes that a hearer believes what has been asserted, unless he is believed not to be a trusting character (i 11 ). Rule i 12 assumes sincerity for goals in a similar way. In all these cases, the cooperative behavior is the default, but it can be overruled by evidence to the contrary. Hence we have i 9 i 8 , i 11 i 10 and i 13 i 12 .
Strict inferences about REs and FPs of communicative acts are only possible regarding the public beliefs or goals of the participants, while inferences about the private mental states of the participants can be made only by default. Sincerity, trust and cooperativity are the assumptions to pass information from the public level to the private one.
Example 3 (Time and persistence; cont'd) Consider the agents i (Ian), j (John) and k (Kay) and their roles v(i) (vendor), c( j) (client) and w(k) (witness). Literal s means "the chair is without faults". The theory contains R inf , inf , plus the following facts and additional rules:
Facts: utter i,k (inform v(i),c( j) (¬s, 1), 1), sell(i, j, 2), B 3 c( j) (reliable(k))}, utter k, j (inform w(k),c( j) (¬s, 3), 3) Rules: r 1 : sell(i, j, 2) ⇒ τ inform v(i),c( j) (s, 2) r 2 : sell(i, j, 2) ⇒ π B 2 c( j) (reliable(i)). r 1 states that when v( j) sells the chair at 2, he acts as if he were informing c( j) that the chair is without faults; r 2 assumes that c( j) defeasibly takes v(i) as reliable. Consider the following relevant derivations For conclusions 7-8 and 11-12, due to the persistence of B 1 v(i) ¬s and B 2 c( j) s, these beliefs should also hold, respectively, at 2 and 3. But they are defeated by opposite arguments, which are in turn defeated by the former ones. (DL is a sceptical non-monotonic formalism: with two conflicting defeasible conclusions DL refrains to take a decision.) [7] [8] show that FPs of some inform acts are violated, 11-12 that some REs are not successful.
Summary
We used DL to study non-monotonicity and time in rolebased agent communication. Non-monotonicity occurs in reasoning about the persistence of FPs and REs of speech acts. Whereas FIPA makes strong assumptions about the private states, the alternative of using public mental attitudes does not make any assumptions about them; using non-monotonic reasoning we can make inferences about the private mental attitudes of the agents which hold only by default and can always be revised. Finally, non-monotonicity can be used for challenges, concessions, and retractions. E.g., an inform is accepted -its content becomes part of the public beliefs of the addressee-unless it is challenged.
